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Abstract 
 Since the start of the financial crisis in 2008, the Federal Reserve has been 
engaging in quantitative easing. Quantitative easing is a form of open market operation in 
which the Federal Reserve buys long-term U.S. government and other securities, versus 
traditional open market operations that occur through the short-term Treasury bill market. 
At the same time, the shadow bank system, which is a system of financial intermediaries 
that perform unregulated credit intermediation outside of traditional banks, has contracted 
significantly. Some argue that this contraction is due to a collateral crunch induced by 
quantitative easing in the shadow bank system—a crunch that occurred when the Federal 
Reserve’s quantitative easing program took high-quality collateral off the market. I will 
focus specifically on repurchase agreements, an instrument within the shadow banking 
that uses the same types of securities that the Federal Reserve has been buying during 
quantitative easing as collateral, to determine whether quantitative easing has led to a 
contraction of the repurchase agreement market. I find that increases in Federal Reserve 
asset holdings from 2005-2013, and specifically during QE1, are associated with 
decreases in primary dealer repurchase agreements. This shows that under certain 
circumstances, Federal Reserve asset purchases lead to contractions in the shadow bank 
system. This paper aims to increase understanding of how monetary policy affects 
shadow banking and understanding of the unintended consequences of monetary policy, 
such as decreased shadow bank lending caused by quantitative easing.  
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
Abstract       ii 
Acknowledgments      iv 
Introduction       1 
Literature Review      5 
Data        16 
Methods       24 
Results       27 
Discussion       38 
Conclusion       58 
Works Cited       60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
First of all, I would like to thank my readers, Professor Sean Flynn and Professor Kerry 
Odell, for their valuable guidance and continual support. I would like to further thank 
Professor Flynn for helping me come up with this topic and for originally convincing me 
to take an Economics course when I came to Scripps. Next, I would like to thank my 
parents and brother for their unwavering encouragement and support. I would also like to 
thank my best friends, the suite life, for always being there. Finally, I would like to thank 
the various professionals who took time out of their schedule to educate me on shadow 
banking and repurchase agreements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
In an attempt to spur economic growth through credit creation, the Federal 
Reserve has been engaging in quantitative easing, a form of monetary policy in which the 
Federal Reserve purchases securities issued by the U.S. Treasury and other agencies. 
Quantitative easing differs from traditional open market operations because the scale is 
much larger, longer-term Treasuries and other types of securities are used, and the focus 
is on adjusting the quantity of reserves, instead of the price of reserves (Dolan 2011). 
Quantitative easing has taken a large amount of long-term Treasury and mortgage-backed 
securities off the market, which may be causing a collateral shortage in the repurchase 
agreement market, because repurchase agreements typically use these very securities. The 
aim of quantitative easing is to increase bank reserves, which the Federal Reserve hopes 
will lead to an increase in lending through an increase in the money supply (The Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2011). Even though quantitative easing has resulted in a huge 
expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, it has not been effective in stimulating 
economic recovery. Each subsequent round of quantitative easing has been less effective 
than the last in stimulating credit creation and economic growth, signifying a diminishing 
effect of the policy (Rosenberg 2013).  
Shadow banks include all entities outside of the regulated banking system that 
perform credit intermediation; the four aspects of credit intermediation include credit risk 
transfer, leverage, liquidity transformation, and maturity transformation (Kodres 2013). 
Shadow banking includes vehicles such as money market funds, hedge funds, structured 
investment vehicles, repurchase agreements, and other non-bank financial instruments 
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(Adrian, Ashcraft and Cetorelli 2013). These instruments are often sponsored by or 
affiliated with banks, investment banks in particular (Kodres 2013). Many shadow banks 
rely on funding provided by repurchase agreements or asset-backed commercial paper, as 
opposed to traditional banks which rely on deposits for funding (Adrian and Ashcraft 
2012).  
Shadow banks behave like banks in that they generate credit by issuing liabilities, 
but they differ from traditional banks in that they are widely unregulated (Adrian and 
Ashcraft 2012). They also do not have access to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) or the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window, making them more 
fragile than traditional banks (Adrian and Ashcraft 2012).1 Certain shadow banking 
instruments, such as repurchase agreements, use U.S. Treasuries, mortgage-backed 
securities, and agency bonds as collateral, but quantitative easing has taken many of these 
securities off the market (McCormick and Kruger 2012). Therefore, some argue that the 
shadow banking system is starved of collateral, which has caused shadow bank lending to 
decrease  (Kessler 2013). In 2008, the shadow bank system contracted significantly, and 
certain facets of shadow banking have experienced little to no growth since that decline 
(Kocjan, Ogilvie, Schneider, and Srinivas 2012). Although the purpose of quantitative 
easing is to increase lending and credit intermediation, if shadow banking has suffered 
due to quantitative easing, then the program may have counterproductive effects. My goal 
is to determine and quantify the effect of quantitative easing on shadow banking. 
                                                          
1 The FDIC is a government entity that insures bank deposits against bank failures. The 
FDIC aims to maintain confidence and stability within the banking system. The Federal 
Reserve Discount Window is where banks can borrow from the Federal Reserve. 
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In order to answer the question of whether quantitative easing has led to a 
decrease in shadow bank credit intermediation, I will focus on repurchase agreements. A 
repurchase agreement, also known as a repo, is a money market instrument used to raise 
capital (BlackRock 2014). It is essentially a collateralized loan. Through a repurchase 
agreement, the owner of a security sells it to an investor, receiving cash in return, with 
the agreement to buy the security back at a predetermined price at a later, predetermined 
date (BlackRock 2014). Repos serve as relatively safe short-term loans for investors and 
cheap financing for security holders (Carpenter 2014). Uses of repurchase agreements 
include meeting short-term funding requirements, obtaining cheaper credit than possible 
through other speculative instruments, financing long positions, and more (Carpenter 
2014). Repos allow the seller to receive secured funding and allow the buyer to receive 
liquidity on a short-term basis. Typically, repurchase agreements are performed on an 
overnight basis, with the security bought back the next day (Financial Stability Board 
2012). I have chosen to focus on repurchase agreements because they inherently require 
the use of collateral and would presumably be directly affected by any collateral 
availability fluctuations caused by quantitative easing. Focusing on repurchase 
agreements, rather than shadow banking as a whole, will make it easier to understand if 
quantitative easing has caused a collateral shortage. Lastly, repurchase agreements often 
involve the use of government and agency securities, which are the types of securities 
that the Federal Reserve has been buying. 
I attempt to determine whether quantitative easing has caused a counterproductive 
consequence of decreased credit intermediation, which, if found to be true, may hold 
monetary policy implications. I aim to increase understanding of the Federal Reserve’s 
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ability to control or influence the shadow banking system. Such an increase in 
understanding might be helpful to policymakers.  
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Literature Review 
Quantitative Easing 
The financial crisis of 2008 and the following recession called for unconventional 
monetary policy (Williams 2013). With interest rates at the zero bound, the Federal 
Reserve could not stimulate demand by lowering interest rates any further (Dolan 2011). 
Therefore, the U.S. central bank responded to the financial crisis through unconventional 
measures. Open market operations, the buying and selling of bonds, have been a major 
form of monetary policy for decades. The financial crisis, however, spurred an innovative 
variety of open market operation. The Federal Reserve started using quantitative easing, a 
specific open market operation wherein the Federal Reserve buys long-term Treasury and 
other securities. Quantitative easing differs from traditional open market operations 
because it operates on a much larger scale, involves the purchase of longer-term 
securities, and focuses on changing the quantity (not the price) of reserves (Dolan 2011).  
When the Federal Reserve buys a security, money is given to the bond dealer that 
previously owned the security, which increases the money supply if the bond dealer 
deposits and the bank lends out the funds. Because the bond dealers are typically part of 
large banks such as Goldman Sachs, the Federal Reserve hopes that the bank, which 
employs the bond dealer, will lend a portion of its increased reserves, thereby expanding 
the money supply and, hopefully, stimulating economic activity. 
Quantitative easing has been pursued on a large scale; the Federal Reserve 
“doubled its balance sheet in the three months after the climax of the crisis in September 
2008”  (Hoermann and Schabert 2011). Before the recession, the Federal Reserve held 
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about $700 billion of Treasuries and partook in open market operations on the scale of 
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars per week (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). 
Today the Fed holds over two trillion dollars of U.S. Treasuries and engages in buying 
tens of billions of U.S. long-term Treasury securities monthly, Federal Reserve holdings 
from April 2005 to March 2013 are seen on Figure 1 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).  
The first round of quantitative easing (QE1) started in November 2008 and lasted for 17 
months. It focused primarily on mortgage-backed security purchases, with the Federal 
Reserve buying $100 billion of securities a month (Harrison 2011). When QE1 ended in 
2010, the Federal Reserve was holding $1.25 trillion of mortgage-backed securities, $300 
billion of U.S. Treasuries, and $175 billion of agency debt (Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis). As the values of mortgage-backed securities crashed, the Fed took many 
mortgage-backed securities onto its balance sheet to prevent further meltdown and to 
support the functioning of credit markets (Harrison 2011). The second round, quantitative 
easing two (QE2), started in November 2010 and continued until June 2011 (Harrison 
2011). During QE2, the Federal Reserve bought $85 billion of U.S. Treasury securities a 
month (Harrison 2011). Quantitative easing 3 (QE3), started in September 2012 and is 
still continuing, but is slowly being phased out. Starting in December 2013, the Federal 
Reserve decided to begin tapering the program by reducing the quantity of securities 
bought by $10 billion each month (Shellock 2013). From September 2012 through 
December 2013, the Federal Reserve was buying $85 billion of bonds a month. The 
monthly purchase consisted of $45 billion of U.S. Treasury securities and $40 billion of 
mortgage-backed securities (Kurtz 2013). Currently, the Federal Reserve is phasing out 
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of QE3 by decreasing the amount of securities bought by $10 billion a month (Financial 
Times 2013). 
Figure 1: Federal Reserve Treasury and MBS Holdings (Millions of Dollars) 
 
Quantitative easing has only been undertaken in troubling economic times when 
traditional monetary policy would not be effective, given that interest rates are at the zero 
lower bound (Martin and Milas 2012). When quantitative easing was first introduced 
after the 2008 financial crisis, the goal was to stabilize a struggling banking system 
(Putnam 2013). Quantitative easing is a “very effective tool for central banks to use when 
combating a failing banking system facing systematic solvency and liquidity challenges” 
(Putnam 2013). Quantitative easing has continued beyond its initial aim during QE1 to 
provide liquidity in private markets through purchases of mortgage-backed securities, and 
has become the Federal Reserve’s main policy to stimulate economic growth. However, 
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some believe that once growth is positive and the banking system is liquid and solvent, 
quantitative easing may have little effect (Bowman, Cai, Davies, and Kamin 2011). 
Quantitative easing has extended far beyond the initial banking challenges that existed at 
the beginning of the recession, and its usefulness has come into question. 
There are varying hypotheses about why the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing 
program has not been effective. First, quantitative easing’s effectiveness is dependent on 
banks lending their increased reserves to the public and the public re-depositing those 
loans. However, banks have instead been holding large quantities of excess reserves 
without lending, which halts the multiple expansion of deposits (Auerbach 2013). 
Furthermore, companies have been hoarding cheap money and not spending it in 
expansionary ways. Also, it is possible that we are in a liquidity trap with low interest 
rates and reluctance to spend due to pessimistic expectations, which would make 
monetary policy efforts aimed at increasing lending and consumption ineffective (Free 
Exchange 2013). Another explanation is that by continuing quantitative easing, the 
Federal Reserve is signifying that it has a pessimistic outlook for the economy. This, in 
turn, may encourage caution and discourage people from increasing their lending and 
spending. Recently, forward guidance by the Federal Reserve has had significant market 
impact, evidenced by markets pricing in Federal Reserve announcements far before 
policies are implemented (Femia, Friedman, and Sack 2013). Lastly, the purchase of 
bonds may have decreased collateral availability, and thus, may have decreased lending 
in the shadow bank system, diminishing the effect of increased loans from banks (Kessler 
2013). 
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As evidenced by the slow recovery, even extremely low interest rates and massive 
liquidity injections are struggling to stimulate the economy. This suggests that 
quantitative easing may not be extremely effective at encouraging economic recovery, or 
that quantitative easing may have other counterproductive consequences. I will focus on 
the possibility of collateral shortages triggered by quantitative easing, which may 
decrease collateral-based credit intermediation through shadow banking. 
 
Shadow Banking 
 Shadow banking is credit intermediation that occurs outside of traditional banks. 
Shadow bank transactions occur through vehicles such as money market funds, 
repurchase agreements, collateralized debt obligations, and more. Shadow bank 
institutions are a network of non-depository financial institutions (Adrian and Ashcraft 
2012). They include both investment banks and non-bank financial institutions, such as 
hedge funds and monoline insurance companies (Adrian, Ashcraft, Boesky, and Pozsar 
2012). It is not the institution that defines a transaction as a shadow banking transaction, 
but rather the type of transaction in general. For example, when the Federal Reserve does 
a repurchase agreement with Goldman Sachs, that transaction is considered part of the 
shadow banking system because a repurchase agreement is a shadow bank instrument. 
Shadow banks perform maturity, liquidity, and credit transformation (Kodres 2013). 
Instead of using deposits, as do traditional banks, shadow banks “typically fund 
themselves with securities lending transactions, i.e., use (and re-use) of the collateral they 
post with banks” (Grung Moe 2012). Shadow banks behave like banks in that they 
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generate credit by issuing liabilities, but they differ from traditional banks in that they are 
widely unregulated and lack access to FDIC and the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window.  
Shadow banking grew substantially in the years leading up to the financial crisis, 
hitting its peak in 2008 at about $20 trillion (Kocjan, Ogilvie, Schneider, and Srinivas 
2012). 2  It peaked prior to the financial crisis partly because banks were able to increase 
profits by securitizing loans to be sold to mutual funds, hedge funds, and other 
institutions (Petroff 2010). By working with investment banks to securitize bank assets, 
banks could boost profits, investors could earn higher returns, and consumers could 
access cheap credit (Petroff 2010). When things turned sour in 2008, the shadow banking 
sector collapsed, as dollar volumes of shadow bank transactions plummeted and asset 
prices dropped substantially. During the following recession, the shadow banking system 
has been strained and some portions of the system have collapsed (Kocjan, Ogilvie, 
Schneider, and Srinivas 2012). Some argue that one explanation for the decrease in 
shadow bank lending is that the shadow banking system is facing a collateral shortage 
(Kessler 2013). The Federal Reserve’s asset purchases through quantitative easing may 
be leaving the shadow banking system without high-quality collateral. In order to test this 
hypothesis, I will focus on a specific instrument within shadow banking, the repurchase 
agreement.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 This $20 trillion value is as according to the Deloitte Shadow Banking Index. However, 
there is contention over measuring the shadow banking sector, which rises from varying 
definitions about what is included within shadow banking. 
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Repurchase Agreements 
A repurchase agreement, or repo, is an instrument within the shadow banking 
system that is inherently tied to collateral, and thus useful in understanding the impact of 
quantitative easing on shadow banking (Carpenter 2014). A repurchase agreement is the 
sale of a security with an agreement to buy the security back at a later date; it is 
essentially a collateralized loan (Fleming and Garbade 2003). The repurchase price is 
greater than the original sale price and that difference is equivalent to interest. This 
effectively makes the person selling the security at the start of the transaction a borrower 
or dealer, while the person initially buying the security is effectively a lender or 
counterparty (see Figure 2). In the repo market “banks and other big financial investors 
pawn their assets in exchange for trillions of dollars’ worth of short term loans every day” 
(Alloway and Rodrigues 2013). The repo market is a huge component of our financial 
system and funds trillions of dollars of transactions daily (Alloway 2013). Repurchase 
agreements have such a large role in our economy in part due to their ability for 
rehypothecation, meaning that the repo lender can perform another repo with the security 
it holds (Kessler 2013).3   Rehypothecation increases collateral velocity and reduces 
transaction costs because collateral can be used for more than one transaction at once 
(Kessler 2013). This means that repos allow for a rapid credit expansion. However, this 
comes with a similar risk as in traditional banking in that the collateral may not be readily 
available in the event of a default. If the ability to sell an asset quickly is the essence of 
                                                          
3 Hypothecation is a financial term that describes the posting of collateral for a loan. 
Rehypothecation refers to the holder of the collateral asset (the lender) turning around 
and using that asset on a second loan in which she is the borrower, not the lender. Thus, 
because the asset gets used as collateral on two loans, it is said to be rehypothecated, that 
is, hypothecated again.  
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liquidity, then the rehypothecation of assets implies that there will be many more loans 
for which only a limited amount of liquefiable collateral is available in case anything 
goes wrong, a liquidity crunch for example. While an asset can be rehypothecated many 
times and thus can support the creation of many loans, the asset can only be sold once 
and thus can only provide liquidity to pay off one of the many loans. 
Figure 2: Repurchase Agreement Diagram 
 
 
 
The repo market often is regarded as safe because of its use of collateral. The repo 
market, however, is extremely volatile in times of market anxiety. In 2008, a collateral 
crunch was a major factor in the financial crisis. Banks were using toxic assets as 
collateral in repo transactions, and their use “to secure repo funding very suddenly 
became unacceptable to other banks, causing financial meltdown” (Alloway 2011). Toxic 
collateral refers to collateral that is overpriced; when the toxic collateral is priced 
correctly there is a sudden drop in available collateral. Once banks stopped accepting this 
overpriced collateral, the market faced a shortage of repo-worthy collateral.  
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Changes in collateral availability can cause large-scale shifts in the repurchase 
agreement market, as evidenced by repo market’s 2011 shock due to the debt ceiling 
crisis (Garcia 2013). The possibility of default led many to worry about the future of the 
repo market, because it is extremely reliant on U.S. Treasury securities. Since the 
financial crisis, the repo market has contracted significantly, and has not experienced 
much growth since (Federal Reserve Bank of New York). While many other shadow 
bank instruments have regained volume and have grown substantially after the crisis, 
dollar volumes of repurchase agreement transactions have stayed at similar levels since 
2008 (see Figure 3). Possible explanations for this contraction include regulatory changes 
such as Basel III and/or a lack of high quality collateral (Kessler 2013). 
Figure 3: Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreements (Millions of Dollars) 
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Collateral Crunch 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, demand for collateral based transactions 
increased. This occurred due to more stringent collateral requirements, including Basel 
III, which forced banks to maintain large amounts of high-quality liquid assets (Fender 
and Lewrick 2013). While financial institutions have increased their demand for high-
quality securities, they are unable to trade the newly acquired securities, effectively 
taking the securities used to satisfy Basel III requirements off the market (Coy 2013).  
Furthermore, Treasuries have become harder to find because the Federal Reserve 
has bought huge amounts of Treasury securities through quantitative easing (Kessler 
2013). These large-scale purchases have led some to worry about the amount of Treasury 
and agency securities actually available for purchase. In December 2012, “investors bid 
for more than four times the amount of two-year notes the Treasury auctioned” 
(McCormick and Kruger 2012). At the same time, the Federal Reserve was absorbing 
approximately “90 percent of net new dollar-denominated fixed-income assets” through 
their monthly QE purchases of $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities and $45 billion 
of U.S. Treasuries (McCormick and Kruger 2012). 
The actual supply of Treasury securities that is available for shadow bank credit 
intermediation seems to be shrinking as demand is increasing (see Figure 4). The supply 
of high-quality collateral is independent of demand changes; the supply of U.S. 
government bonds is driven by the financing needs of the government, not by the amount 
of Treasury securities demanded in the market. Furthermore, strict capital requirements 
and Federal Reserve purchases have contracted tradable supply further (Coy 2013). The 
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securities that allow for shadow bank credit intermediation are becoming harder and 
harder to find. 
Figure 4: Supply and Demand for High Quality Collateral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
• D and S 
represent 
initial supply 
and demand 
• D’ represents 
increased 
demand for 
high quality 
collateral due 
to more 
stringent 
collateral 
requirements 
• S’ represents 
decreased 
supply due to 
QE 
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Data 
To determine the effect of Federal Reserve holdings, specifically changes due to 
quantitative easing, on repurchase agreement flows, I construct a time-series data set 
using weekly data from April 2005 to March 2013. I focus on repurchase agreements 
because they are an instrument within shadow banking that implicitly requires the use of 
collateral, and would be most affected by changes in collateral availability. 
The following subsections detail each of the data series that I construct and which 
will be used below in regressions to determine the effect of quantitative easing on the 
repo market. The first subsection discusses the dependent variable. The next discusses the 
various independent variables. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Change in Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreements (Millions of Dollars) 
 In the regressions below, the left-hand side variable is the weekly change in 
repurchase agreements by primary dealers. This is calculated as a difference; repurchase 
agreements at time 0 minus repurchase agreements at time t-1. It is the first difference of 
weekly repurchase agreements. I used the flow of primary dealer repurchase agreements 
because level values are non-stationary.4 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
                                                          
4 Stationarity is commonly assumed in time series regressions. Stationarity means that the 
mean, variance, and autocorrelation do not change over time. Stationarity makes it easier 
to predict values using regressions. 
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publishes the data needed to calculate these first differences weekly. This data series is 
the most comprehensive repurchase agreement series available.  
Primary dealers serve as trading counterparties to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, and participate as counterparties in New York Federal Reserve trades. The 
minimum capital threshold to become a primary dealer is $150 million (Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York 2010). Primary dealers report weekly to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York on their trading activities, financing positions, and cash positions. The data 
represents the aggregate amount of overnight/continuing and term agreement repurchase 
agreements by primary dealers. While other smaller institutions not classified as primary 
dealers can perform repos, the “primary dealer data include all repos that use open market 
operations (OMO)-eligible and corporate collateral…Primary dealers do not comprise the 
entire universe of securities dealers active in the repo market, but [Copeland, Davis, 
LeSueur and Margin argue] that the vast majority of repo activity is conducted by these 
dealers” (Copeland, Davis, LeSueur, and Martin 2012). Thus, primary dealer repos 
provide a strong estimate for movements across the total repurchase agreement. Primary 
dealers are the most likely dealers to be affected by Federal Reserve policy because the 
Federal Reserve trades directly with them.  
Independent Variables 
Change in Short-Term Treasury Securities Held by the Fed (Millions of Dollars) 
 Change in short-term Treasury securities held by the Fed is the weekly change in 
U.S. Treasury securities maturing within one year held by the Federal Reserve. The unit 
is millions of dollars. The calculation for this series is: short-term Treasuries held by the 
18 
 
Fed at time 0 minus short-term Treasuries held by the Fed at time t-1; it is the first 
difference of short-term securities held by the Federal Reserve. The data is published 
weekly on the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database. I used the flow of short-term 
Treasuries because level values are non-stationary. This sums the FRED data series “U.S. 
Treasury securities held by the Federal Reserve: Maturing” within 15 days, 16-90 days, 
and 91 days to 1 year (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). 
Change in Long-Term Treasury Securities Held by the Fed (Millions of Dollars) 
 Change in long-term Treasury securities held by the Fed is the weekly change in 
U.S. Treasury securities maturing in over one year held by the Federal Reserve. The unit 
is millions of dollars. This is calculated as: long-term Treasuries held by the Fed at time 0 
minus long-term Treasuries held by the Fed at time t-1; it is the first difference of long-
term securities held by the Federal Reserve. The data is published weekly on the St. 
Louis Federal Reserve FRED database. I use the flow of long-term Treasuries because 
level values are non-stationary. This sums FRED data series “U.S. Treasury securities 
held by the Federal Reserve: Maturing in” 1-5 years, 5-10 years, and over 10 years 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). 
Change in Mortgage-Backed Securities Held by the Fed (Millions of Dollars) 
 Change in mortgage-backed securities held by the Fed is the weekly change in the 
dollar value mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal Reserve, in millions of 
dollars. The calculation is: mortgaged-backed securities held by the Fed at time 0 minus 
mortgage-backed securities held by the Fed at time t-1; it is the first difference of 
mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal Reserve. The data is published weekly on 
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the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database under the title “Mortgage-backed securities 
held by the Federal Reserve: All Maturities.” I use the flow of mortgage-backed 
securities held by the fed, because the levels are non-stationary.  
Change in Federal Debt Held by the Public (Millions of Dollars) 
 This is the weekly change in U.S. federal debt held by the public. Debt held by 
the public consists of all federal debt held by individuals, corporations, state governments, 
local governments, foreign governments, and other entities (TreasuryDirect). It does not 
include the Federal Financing Bank or the Federal Reserve. It includes, but is not limited 
to, securities such as Treasury bills, Treasury notes, Treasury bonds, U.S. savings bonds, 
state and local government securities, and Treasury inflation-protected securities. The 
United States Treasury publishes level values daily. I use the weekly flow of federal debt 
held by the public, because the levels are non-stationary. 
Change in Federal Debt Held by the Government (Millions of Dollars) 
 This is the weekly change in intragovernmental holdings of U.S. Federal Debt. 
Intragovernmental holdings consist of Government Account Series securities held by 
government trust funds, special funds, and revolving funds. Intragovernmental holdings 
are incurred when the government borrows from federal trust funds to fund government 
operations. These holdings consist primarily of the Social Security Trust Fund, the 
Medicare Trust Fund, and Federal Financing Bank securities (Treasury Direct). The 
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United States Treasury publishes level values daily. I use the weekly flow of 
intragovernmental holdings, because the levels are non-stationary.5  
Treasury Fails/Treasury Transactions (Percentage Points) 
 This series consists of the dollar value of primary dealer “fails to deliver” on U.S. 
government securities divided by the dollar value of primary dealer outright and 
financing transactions of U.S. government securities (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York). The fails data includes fails for both outright and financing transactions (Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York). U.S. government fails occur when transactions using 
Treasury securities fail to settle on the agreed upon date (Fleming and Garbade 2005). 
Failures to deliver occur when a primary dealer does not deliver a security for a 
transaction on the agreed upon date.  
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York also publishes failure to receive data. 
Because the failure to deliver and failure receive data series have a correlation coefficient 
of 0.99, I choose to use only failures to deliver. Fails are reported weekly on a cumulative 
basis. Fails continue to be counted until the transaction is settled (Fleming and Garbade 
2005). For example, if a dealer fails to deliver $10 million of Treasury securities on a 
Monday, but delivers the securities that Tuesday, then the dealer reports $10 million in 
fails to deliver. If that $10 million delivery does not occur until Friday, four days after the 
scheduled date, then the dealer reports $40 million in fails to deliver.  
                                                          
5 Note that neither the change in federal debt held by the public nor the change in federal 
debt held by the government includes debt held by the Federal Reserve. Change in 
federal debt held by the Federal Reserve is reflected in change in short-term and long-
term Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve. 
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Fails are believed to affect market liquidity, particularly when they occur at high 
levels (Fleming and Garbade 2005). Fails and transaction data series are published 
weekly by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The quotient Treasury Fails/Treasury 
Transactions represents the proportion of primary dealer Treasury securities failures to 
deliver divided by primary dealer outright and financing transactions using Treasury 
securities. The Treasury transactions value includes T-bills, Treasury coupons, and 
Treasury inflation-indexed securities for both outright and financing transactions. It does 
not include repurchase agreements, because the primary dealer survey does not specify 
the type of security used in repurchase agreements. Therefore, the Treasury security 
transactions value likely leaves out some transactions that use Treasury securities, repos 
in particular. 
Mortgage-Backed Security Fails/Mortgage-Backed Security Transactions (Percentage 
Points) 
Mortgage-backed security fails/mortgage-backed security transactions is the 
dollar value of primary dealer fails to deliver mortgage-backed securities divided by the 
dollar value of primary dealer outright and financing transactions of mortgage-backed 
securities. Fails data includes fails for both outright and financing transactions. 
Mortgage-backed fails occur when transactions using mortgage-backed securities fail to 
settle on the agreed upon date. Failures to deliver occur when a primary dealer does not 
deliver a security for a transaction on the agreed upon date. Fails and transaction data 
series are published weekly by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Mortgage-backed 
security fails/mortgage-backed security transactions represents the proportion of 
mortgage-backed securities failures to deliver by primary dealers divided by the outright 
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and financing transactions using mortgage-backed securities by primary dealers. The 
denominator likely leaves out some transactions because I only use primary dealer data 
that specifies when mortgage-backed securities are being used.   
Dummy Variables 
In the regressions below, I also used a number of binary (zero or one) dummy variables: 
2005- Dummy variable for the year 2005 
2006-Dummy variable for the year 2006 
2007-Dummy variable for the year 2007 
2008-Dummy variable for the year 2008 
2009-Dummy variable for the year 2009 
2010-Dummy variable for the year 2010 
2011-Dummy variable for the year 2011 
2012-Dummy variable for the year 2012 
Basel III- Dummy variable for the after the Basel III capital, liquidity, and leverage 
requirements changes were agreed upon on 12/16/2010. Basel III raises banks’ required 
amounts of capital, introduces a minimum leverage ratio, and introduces required 
liquidity ratios 
Crisis- Dummy variable for after Lehman Brothers collapse on 9/15/2008 
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QE1- Dummy variable for the first round of quantitative easing from 11/25/2008-
3/31/2010 
QE2-Dummy variable for the second round of quantitative easing from 3/3/2010-
6/30/2011 
QE3-Dummy variable for the third round of quantitative easing from 9/13/2012-the end 
of the dataset (3/27/2013) 
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the aforementioned variables. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Repo Repo flow, millions of dollars -651.5 107,947.9 -564,857 256,845 
Fed ST 
Treasuries 
Flow of Fed holdings of 
short-term Treasuries, 
millions of dollars 
-909.17 4,493.03 -38,266 12,335 
Fed LT 
Treasuries 
Flow of Fed holdings of long-
term Treasuries, millions of 
dollars 
3,504.62 7,760.02 -19,710 39,682 
Fed MBS Flow of Fed holdings of 
mortgage-backed securities, 
millions of dollars 
2,580.56 15,768.47 -17,390 167,531 
Debt Held by 
Public 
Flow of debt held by the 
public, millions of dollars 
14,988.61 36,911.35 -73,987.3 236,328 
Debt Held by 
Government 
Flow of debt held by the 
government, millions of 
dollars 
4,023.32 21,125.66 -63,068.6 105,527.8 
Treasury 
Tightness 
Treasury fails/Treasury 
transactions, percentage 
points 
2.27 6.11 0.15 57.23 
MBS 
Tightness 
MBS fails/MBS transactions, 
percentage points 
13.34 16.16 0.15 84.14 
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Methods 
I test the effect of quantitative easing on repurchase agreements using ordinary 
least squares regressions.  
I apply the Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests on all continuous variables to ensure their 
stationarity. The null hypothesis of the Dickey-Fuller test is that the variable being tested 
contains a unit root; the alternative hypothesis is that the variable is stationary. The null 
hypothesis was rejected for all variables, ensuring that all continuous variables are 
stationary. Next, I determine the optimal lag length by finding the autoregressive process 
that minimizes the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). I use heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors for all regressions. 
With those preliminaries completed, I estimate the following regression model, 
which explores the relationship between the dependent variable, weekly change in 
primary dealer repurchase agreements, and the independent variables: change in short-
term Treasury securities held by the Fed, change in long-term Treasury securities held by 
the Fed, change in mortgage-backed securities held by the Fed, change in federal debt 
held by the public, change in federal debt held by the government, Treasury 
fails/Treasury transactions, mortgage-backed security fails/mortgage-backed security 
transactions, and dummy variables for years 2005-2010, Basel III, the financial crisis, and 
rounds one to three of quantitative easing. 
Expressed algebraically, the model looks like: 
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I then run a similar regression, using BIC determined optimal lags.   
 
 
Next, I run specific regressions during each period of quantitative easing to see if the 
effect on repurchase agreement flows varies across the three rounds. I also run these 
regressions with a variety of lags. 
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 These regressions attempt to isolate the effects of Federal Reserve purchases on 
the flows of repurchase agreements. Two limitations are that these regressions assume 
that changes in primary dealer repurchase agreements are indicative of repo flows across 
the entire repo market and there may be omitted variable bias.  
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Results 
A. Regressions for Entire Time Period 
 The first set of regressions regress primary dealer repurchase agreement weekly 
changes on the dependent variables from April 6th, 2005 to March 27th, 2013. The units of 
the dependent variable are millions of dollars. This timeframe contains 415 weekly 
observations. The first regression uses no lags. The second regression uses the lags 
determined by prior BIC tests. The regression results are presented in columns of (1) and 
(2), respectively of Table 2. 
Regression 1 
 In Regression 1, with no lags, the following variables were statistically significant: 
change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed, change in federal debt held by the public, 
change in federal debt held by the government, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 
Basel III. 
The results indicate that a 1 million dollar increase in change of short-term 
Treasuries held by the Fed is associated with a 2.64 million dollar increase in change in 
primary dealer repurchase agreements, on average. The results also indicate that a 1 
million dollar increase in federal debt held by the public leads to a -0.63 million dollar 
decrease in weekly repo flows. Further, a 1 million dollar increase in federal debt held by 
the government is associated with a -2.09 million dollar decrease in weekly repo flows. 
The negative coefficient on Basel III indicates that weekly repurchase agreement flows 
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dropped significantly after Basel III was passed. This model explains 24.91% of the 
variation in change of primary dealer repurchase agreements.  
Regression 2 
 In Regression 2, using BIC optimal lags, the following variables were statistically 
significant: one to three week lags of weekly repurchase agreement flows, a two-week lag 
of mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal Reserve, change in federal debt held 
by the public, change in federal debt held by the government, a three week lag of change 
in federal debt by the government, Treasury fails/Treasury transactions (Treasury market 
tightness), a one-week lag of Treasury market tightness, a two-week lag of MBS 
fails/MBS transactions (mortgage-backed security market tightness), 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010, Basel III, and QE3. 
The negative coefficients on all three lags of weekly repurchase agreement 
changes indicate that a one million dollar increase in repo flows is associated with a 
decrease of 0.22 million dollars one week later, a decrease of 0.12 million dollars two 
weeks later, and a decrease of 0.11 million dollars three weeks later, on average. A one 
million dollar increase in change in mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal 
Reserve is associated with a 1.23 million decrease in weekly change in primary dealer 
repurchase agreements. A one million dollar increase in federal debt held by the public 
leads to a 0.33 million dollar decrease in repurchase agreement flows, on average. A one 
million increase in federal debt held by the government is associated with to a 2.14 
million dollar decrease in weekly repo flows, while a three-week lagged million dollar 
increase in federal debt held by the government is associated with a 0.31 million dollar 
increase in weekly repurchase agreement flows. A one percentage point increase in 
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Treasury fails/Treasury transactions, which represents Treasury market tightness, is 
associated with a 4,513.48 million dollar decrease, and a one-week lag of Treasury 
market tightness is associated with a 3,244.95 million dollar decrease in repo flows, on 
average. A one percentage point increase in mortgage-backed security market tightness is 
associated with a 1,722.33 million dollar decrease in change in primary dealer repurchase 
agreements, on average. Furthermore, my regression results indicate that Basel III led to a 
decrease in weekly flows in repurchase agreements. Lastly, the third round of quantitative 
easing is associated with an increase in weekly repo flows. This model explains 39.41% 
of the variation in change of primary dealer repurchase agreements. 
Table 2: Repurchase Agreement Flows (2005-2013) 
Section A: Regressions 1 and 2 
  (1) (2) 
Constant 218104.8 814666.70 
  (62255.50) (192948.20) 
L1.Repo flow   -0.22** 
    (0.05) 
L2.Repo flow   -0.12** 
    (0.05) 
L3.Repo flow   -0.11** 
    (0.04) 
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed 2.64* 2.26 
  (1.58) (1.53) 
Chang in long-term Treasuries held by the Fed 0.13 0.34 
  (0.87) (0.73) 
Change in mortgage-backed securities held by Fed 0.5 -0.16 
  (0.33) (0.28) 
L1.Fed MBS flow   -0.20 
    (0.27) 
L2.Fed MBS flow   -1.23** 
    (0.36) 
Change in federal debt held by the public -0.63** -0.33* 
  (0.19) (0.19) 
L1.Federal debt public flow   0.25 
    (0.19) 
Change in federal debt held by the government -2.09** -2.14** 
  (0.45) (0.43) 
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L1.Federal debt government flow   -0.04 
    (0.18) 
L2.Federal debt government flow   0.30 
    (0.19) 
L3. Federal debt government flow    0.31* 
    (0.17) 
Treasury Fails/Transactions 727.74 -4,513.48** 
  (1977.54) (2169.28) 
L1.Treasury tightness   -3,244.95** 
    (1438.86) 
MBS Fails/Transactions -137.22 -59.05 
  (488.43) (493.06) 
L1.MBS tightness   767.05 
    (555.35) 
L2.MBS tightness   -1,722.33** 
    (604.21) 
L3.MBS tightness   693.55 
    (603.05) 
2005 -190443.6** -498,440.50** 
  (67749.81) (113805.80) 
2006 -208001.1** -514,131.70** 
  (65616.20) (111340.40) 
2007 -187354.6** -475,037.60** 
  (36675.36) (105590.10) 
2008 -183161.6** -446,481.70** 
  (63375.36) (98789.69) 
2009 -96538.09** -257,742.40** 
  (49393.15) (63422.54) 
2010 -86403.9** -198,091.10** 
  (42776.19) (51359.34) 
2011 9861.22 -66,497.67 
  (33873.81) (40397.61) 
2012 14218.39  1796.86  
  (25763.01) (25035.13) 
Basel III -117121.5** -129,248.10** 
  (24648.53) (27409.43) 
Crisis -83434.21 583.32 
  (51316.69) (59298.14) 
QE1 -27338.8 -49,916.70 
  (33449.82) (32815.94) 
QE2 -30679.27 -21,900.48 
  (23788.17) (23917.14) 
QE3 -19042 39,755.51* 
  (19370.80) (22464.69) 
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n 415 412 
R2 0.2491 0.3941 
F 5.5 7.43 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*p<0.10, **p<0.05     
 
B. Regressions During Quantitative Easing 1 (QE 1) 
 The first round of quantitative easing (QE1) lasted from November 25, 2008 to 
March 31, 2010. During QE1, the Federal Reserve bought $1.25 trillion of mortgage-
backed securities, $300 billion of U.S. Treasuries, and $175 billion of agency securities.  
This section reports on the same two regression models described above, but 
estimated only on data from the QE1 period. The units of the dependent variable are 
millions of dollars. The QE1 timeframe contains 70 weekly observations. The first 
regression uses no lags. The second regression incudes the same variables as Regression 
1, with the addition of one- and two-week lags of the change in mortgage-backed 
securities held by the Federal Reserve, as indicated using BICs.  
Regression 1 
 Table 3 reveals that in a regression using all continuous variables and dummy 
variables for the years 2009 and 2010, the following independent variables are 
statistically significant: change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed, change in long-
term Treasuries held by the Fed, change in federal debt held by the public, and MBS 
fails/MBS transactions (mortgage-backed security market tightness), 2009, and 2010. The 
estimated slope coefficients demonstrate that a 1 million dollar increase in the change in 
short-term Treasuries held by the Fed leads to a 14.72 million dollar decrease of the 
change in primary dealer repurchase agreements, on average. A one million dollar 
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increase in long-term Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve is associated with a 3.99 
million dollar decrease in weekly repo flows. A one million dollar increase in federal 
debt held by the public leads to a 1.15 unit decrease in weekly repurchase agreements, on 
average. A one percentage point increase in mortgage-backed security market tightness is 
associated with a 2,537.49 million dollar decrease in weekly repurchase agreement flows. 
This model explains 30.87% of the variation in change in primary dealer repurchase 
agreements during QE1.  
Regression 2 
The second regression incudes all continuous variables, plus the addition of one- 
and two-week lags of the change in primary dealer repurchase agreements and the change 
in mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal Reserve. The results reported in Table 
3 indicate that the following independent variables are statistically significant: one-week 
lag of repurchase agreement flow, change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed, 
change in long-term Treasuries held by the Fed, a two-week lag of change in mortgage-
backed securities held by the Fed, change in federal debt held by the public, change in 
federal debt held by the government, MBS market tightness, 2009, and 2010. A one 
million dollar increase in last week’s repo change is associated with a 0.23 million dollar 
decrease in repo flows. A one million dollar increase in short-term Treasuries held by the 
Fed is associated with a 12.75 million dollar decrease in repo flows, and a one million 
dollar increase in long-term securities held by the Fed is associated with a 3.29 million 
dollar decrease in repo flows. An increase in mortgage-backed securities held by the 
Federal Reserve leads to a 1.20 million decrease in repurchase agreement change, on 
average. Increases in federal debt held by the public and by the government are 
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associated with repo flow decreases of 0.99 and 1.48 million respectively. A one 
percentage point increase in mortgage-backed security market tightness is associated with 
a 2,131.59 million dollar decrease in weekly repurchase agreement flows. This model 
explains 44.86% of the variation in change of primary dealer repurchase agreements 
during QE1.  
Table 3: Regressions During QE1 
Section B: Regressions 1 and 2 
  (1) (2) 
Constant -160396.7 -131820.90 
  (100467.70) (101276.90) 
L1.Repo flow 
 
-0.23* 
  
 
(0.13) 
L2.Repo flow 
 
-0.08 
  
 
(0.12) 
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed -14.72** -12.75** 
  (4.38) (4.56) 
Change  in long-term Treasuries held by the Fed -3.99** -3.29* 
  (2.02) (1.66) 
Change in mortgage-backed securities held by Fed 0.6 0.18 
  (0.49) (0.51) 
L1.Fed MBS flow 
 
-0.15 
  
 
(0.39) 
L2.Fed MBS flow 
 
-1.20** 
  
 
(0.31) 
Change in federal debt held by the public -1.15** -0.99** 
  (0.34) (0.32) 
Change in federal debt held by the government -1.28 -1.48* 
  (0.92) (0.86) 
Treasury Fails/Transactions 8152.65 2,522.42 
  (7113.57) (7769.44) 
MBS Fails/Transactions -2537.49** -2,131.59* 
  (1123.00) (1085.07) 
2009 212444.5** 211,932.80** 
  (80392.67) (92027.90) 
2010 273170.4** 256,832.60** 
  (87913.67) (96573.59) 
  
  n 70 70 
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R2 0.3087 0.4486 
F 2.4 2.93 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *p<0.10, **p<0.05 
   
C. Regressions During Quantitative Easing Two (QE2) 
 The second round of quantitative easing, QE2, lasted from November 3, 2010 to 
June 30, 2011. During QE2, the Federal Reserve concentrated on long-term U.S. 
Treasury securities. The Fed bought $75 billion of U.S. Treasuries per month. There are 
35 weekly observations during QE2. This is important to note because the small sample 
size of only 35 weeks raises questions about the validity of the regression results for the 
two regressions. The first regression uses no lags. The second regression uses the same 
variables as in regression one plus a one-week lag of repurchase agreement flows. 
Regression 1 
 In this regression, I use all continuous variables and dummy variables for 2010 
and Basel III. As shown in Table 4, the following independent variables are statistically 
significant: change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed, change in federal debt held 
by the public, change in federal debt held by the government, Treasury fails/Treasury 
transactions (Treasury market tightness), 2010, and Basel III. The results indicate that 
repo flows increase by 8.68 million per every one million increase in short-term 
Treasuries held by the Fed. A one million dollar increase in federal debt held by the 
public is associated with a 1.05 million dollar decrease in change in repurchase 
agreements. A one million dollar increase in change in federal debt held by the 
government is associated with a 0.71 million dollar decrease in repo flows. As Treasury 
market tightness increases by one percentage point, primary dealer repurchase agreement 
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change decreases by 28,432.39 million, on average. This model explains 56.3% of the 
variation in change in primary dealer repurchase agreement flows.  
Regression 2 
 Regression 2 uses the same variables as in Regression 1, but also includes a one-
week lag of repo flows. The results do not vary significantly as a similar set of 
independent variables are found to be statistically significant: one-week lag of repo flows, 
change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed, change in federal debt held by the public, 
change in federal debt held by the government agencies, Treasury fails/Treasury 
transactions (Treasury market tightness), 2010, and Basel III. Compared to the first 
regression, the coefficient for change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed falls to 
8.16, the coefficient for change in federal debt held by the public falls to -1.03, the 
coefficient for change in federal debt held by the public falls to -1.31, and the coefficient 
for Treasury fails/Treasury transactions falls to -38,054.62. 62.15% of the variation in 
change in primary dealer repurchase agreement flows is explained by this model.  
Table 4: Regressions During QE2 
Section C: Regressions 1 and 2 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept 86122.11 108975.10 
  (49744.58) (35725.90) 
L1.Repo flow 
 
-0.38** 
  
 
(0.19) 
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed 8.68** 8.16** 
  (3.40) (3.65) 
Change in long-term Treasuries held by the Fed 1.56 0.98 
  (1.10) (1.01) 
Change in mortgage-backed securities held by Fed 1.21 -1.03 
  (2.12) (1.50) 
Change in federal debt held by the public -1.05** -1.03** 
  (0.35) (0.36) 
Change in federal debt held by the government -0.71* -1.31** 
  (0.38) (0.44) 
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Treasury Fails/Treasury Transactions -28432.39* -38,054.62* 
  (15166.39) (19425.70) 
MBS Fails/MBS Transactions 123.89 775.54 
  (823.07) (1043.47) 
2010 -100250.6** -152,283.60** 
  (33088.14)   (33,484.48) 
Basel III -120,731.00** -151,555.90** 
  (34432.13) (29024.28) 
n 35 35 
R2 0.563 0.6215 
F 6.87 13.5 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 
   
D. Regressions During Quantitative Easing Three (QE3) 
 The third round of quantitative easing, QE3, started on September 13, 2012 and 
continued beyond the end of the dataset in March 2013. Currently, as of April 2014, QE3 
is in the process of tapering. QE3 was still ongoing at its original, non-tapered rate as of 
the last date included in my data set. During QE3, the Federal Reserve bought both 
mortgage-backed securities and U.S. long-term Treasuries. The Fed was buying $40 
billion of mortgage-backed securities and $45 billion of long-term U.S. Treasuries a 
month. My dataset contains 28 weekly observations during QE3. The small sample size 
raises questions about the validity of the regression results, especially considering the 
large number of variables. My QE3 regression uses no lags because the BICs did not 
suggest using any lags. 
Regression 1 
 In Regression 1, I use all continuous variables and a dummy variable for 2012. 
None of the independent variables are statistically significant in this regression. 
Furthermore, minimizing BICs does not suggest using a lag for any of the continuous 
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variables. My model explains 25% of the variation in change in primary dealer 
repurchase agreements during QE3. The F-statistic equals 0.84, which is not statistically 
significant and suggests a 58.27% probability of receiving an F-statistic as extreme as 
mine if the null hypothesis that the coefficients are 0 is true. 
Table 5: Regressions During QE3 
Section D: Regression 1 
  (1) 
Constant -56346.86 
  (67260.32) 
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed -38.74 
  (66.93) 
Change in long-term Treasuries held by the Fed 1.86 
  (3.46) 
Change in mortgage-backed securities held by Fed 0.58 
  (0.69) 
Change in federal debt held by the public -0.23 
  (0.43) 
Change in federal debt held by the government -1.25 
  (0.74) 
Treasury Fails/Transactions 21611.38 
  (34512.32) 
MBS Fails/Transactions 413.05 
  (2595.41) 
2012 32622.78 
  (36469.40) 
n 28  
R2 0.25  
F 0.84  
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *p<0.10, **p<0.05 
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Discussion of Results 
A. Regressions for Entire Time Period 
The first set of regressions that are reported in Table 2 includes regressions across 
the entire time period from 2005 to 2013. During this time period, the aggregate amount 
of repurchase agreements traded weekly by primary dealers rose until reaching a peak of 
$4,567,192 million in 2008. As the recession started in late 2008, the aggregate amount 
of repurchase agreements dropped substantially and has continued to stagnate since (see 
Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Aggregate Amount of Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreements (Millions 
of Dollars) 
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The Federal Reserve started the first round of quantitative easing on November 25, 2008. 
At the start of QE1, the Federal Reserve held $648,589 million of long-term U.S. 
Treasury securities, $96,290 million of short-term U.S. Treasury securities, and $622,864 
million of mortgage-backed securities. At the end of my data set, March 27, 2013, the 
Federal Reserve held $1,794,146 million of long-term U.S. Treasury securities, $314 
million of short-term U.S. Treasury securities, and $1,070,932 of mortgage-backed 
securities (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Federal Reserve Holdings of U.S. Treasuries and Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (Millions of Dollars) 
 
 
 Regression 1 uses no lagged variables, while Regression 2 uses optimal lags as 
determined by the BIC. I believe the second model with some BIC selected lags is the 
most accurate, as changes in repurchase agreements are likely to be dependent on earlier 
happenings. I am primarily testing for the effects of Federal Reserve purchases on the 
40 
 
repurchase agreement market, and the effects of these changes may not occur 
immediately. 
 Regression 2, which uses some lags, found negative correlations between one-
week, two-week, and three-week lags of primary dealer repurchase agreement flows. 
These negative correlations suggest the volatile nature of repurchase agreement flows 
across this time period. While the general trend across 2008 was a decline in repo flows, 
repo flows stagnated and fluctuated both positively and negatively from 2009 onwards.  
The non-lagged regression, Regression 1, found that change in short-term 
Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve had a positive correlation with the change in 
primary dealer repurchase agreements. The Federal Reserve decreased their holdings of 
short-term Treasuries, signifying that the change in Federal Reserve holdings of short-
term Treasuries was negative for most of the period. This result suggests that as the 
Federal Reserve decreased its holdings of short-term Treasury securities, the quantity of 
repurchase agreements by primary dealers also fell. Both the change in Federal Reserve 
holdings of short-term Treasuries and the change in primary dealer repurchase 
agreements dropped significantly during 2008, which is likely to be the cause of this 
positive relationship. Furthermore, in Figure 6, it is clear that the volume of short-term 
Treasuries sold by the Fed is much smaller than the volume of long-term Treasuries and 
mortgage-backed securities bought by the Fed. The regression with some lags failed to 
find a significant relationship. Therefore, I believe the non-lagged results may represent a 
spurious relationship that occurred from the negative trend in both series. 
While change in long-term Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve has no 
statistically significant impact on repurchase agreement flows, a two-week lag of change 
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in mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal Reserve is statistically significant. This 
negative coefficient suggests that repurchase agreement flows fall two weeks after the 
Fed acquires additional mortgage-backed securities. This could be evidence in favor of 
my hypothesis that an increase in Federal Reserve purchases causes declines in 
repurchase agreement lending.  
Change in federal debt held by the public had statistically significant negative 
coefficients in both regressions. Federal debt held by the public includes individuals, 
corporations, state and local governments, and other entities. The negative correlation 
suggests that most of the entities included in this data series do not make their holdings of 
Treasury securities available for repurchase agreements. Large investment banks and 
other financial institutions, which make up only a portion of this category, are likely to 
trade Treasury securities, but the other groups may refrain from doing so. The small 
magnitude suggests that a $1 million increase in federal debt held by the public leads to 
only a $0.33 million decrease in repurchase agreement flows. This confirms my 
hypothesis that some of the Treasury securities under this bucket are traded, while others 
are taken off the market. It is the securities taken off the market that lead to the negative 
coefficient. 
Change in federal debt held by government agencies had statistically significant 
negative coefficients in both regressions. These coefficients were -2.09 and -2.14 in the 
non-lagged and lagged regressions respectively. Federal debt held by the government 
includes securities held by government trust funds, such as the Social Security Trust Fund. 
Securities are typically not traded after being included in these funds, which explains the 
negative coefficient. An additional one million dollars of debt held by the government 
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leads to a $2.1 million decrease in repurchase agreements. This falls in line with the 
rehypothecation of repurchase agreements. Securities can be lent multiple times; 
therefore, taking a single repurchase agreement off the market has a multiplied effect. 
The negative coefficients suggest that holdings of U.S. Treasuries in government 
agencies are not available for further repos.  
It appears that primary dealer repurchase agreements fall as federal debt held by 
any group increases. This is counterintuitive because it seems that an increase in the 
federal debt, and thus U.S. Treasuries, would lead to an increase in repurchase 
agreements. The coefficients of federal debt held by the public and federal debt held by 
government agencies of -0.33 and -2.09 respectively, suggest that Treasuries held by the 
public have a greater likelihood of being traded.  
The lagged regression reports large significant coefficients on Treasury 
fails/Treasury transactions, which represents Treasury market tightness. This suggests 
that as the Treasury market becomes tighter, fewer repurchase agreements happen. This 
supports my hypothesis that collateral scarcity has the potential to cause drastic changes 
in repurchase agreement market transactions. The coefficients for no lag and a one-week 
lag equal -4,513.48 and -3,244.95 respectively.  
 Similarly, the lagged regression, Regression 2, finds a statistically significant 
two-week lag of mortgage-backed security market tightness with a negative correlation. 
This suggests that as mortgage-backed securities become scarcer, primary dealer 
repurchase agreements fall two weeks later. This indicates that it may take some time for 
the full effect of the market tightness to reach the repurchase agreement market. It is 
interesting to note that both MBS market tightness and MBS held by the Fed are 
43 
 
statistically significant with a two-week lag. This is a potential indication that effects in 
the repurchase agreement market due to mortgage-backed security changes do not happen 
immediately.  
Finally, the dummy variable for Basel III is statistically significant for both 
regressions; the coefficients are -117,121.5 in Regression 1 and -129,248.10 in 
Regression 2. This implies that the collateral requirements introduced by Basel III caused 
the volume of repurchase agreements to fall drastically. This suggests that as banks 
prepared for more stringent capital rules, securities that could be used in repos were taken 
off the repo market, causing change in primary dealer repurchase agreements to fall.  
Regression 1 explains 24.91% of the variation in primary dealer repurchase 
agreement flows. Regression 2 explains 39.41% of the variation in primary dealer 
repurchase agreement flows. These results suggest that under certain circumstances, 
increases in Federal Reserve holdings of repo-worthy assets lead do decreases of 
repurchase agreement flows. 
 
B. Regressions During Quantitative Easing 1 (QE1) 
QE1 lasted from November 25, 2008 to March 31, 2010. During this timeframe, 
the Federal Reserve focused on buying mortgage-backed securities, buying $1.25 trillion 
of mortgage-backed securities, $300 billion of U.S. Treasuries, and $175 billion of 
agency securities. I perform two regressions using data from QE1: Regression 1 with no 
lags and Regression 2 with BIC determined lags. These regression results are located in 
Table 3. 
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Repo levels fell significantly at the end of 2008. The amount of primary dealer 
repurchase agreements fluctuated, but continued to trend downward from the beginning 
of 2009 to the end of QE1 in March 2010 (see Figure 7). During this time period, the 
Federal Reserve was buying mortgage-backed securities and some long-term Treasury 
securities, taking large amounts of these securities off the market. The Federal Reserve 
also sold a small amount of short-term Treasury securities, which added to the supply of 
assets that could be used in repos. However, the magnitude of long-term Treasuries and 
mortgage-backed securities bought by the Fed dwarfs the amount of short-term 
Treasuries sold by the Fed during QE1. Figure 8 shows Federal Reserve holdings during 
the first round of quantitative easing. 
Figure 7: Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreements During QE1 (Millions of Dollars) 
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Figure 8: Federal Reserve Holdings During QE1 (Millions of Dollars) 
 
The lagged regression finds a one-week lag of change in primary dealer 
repurchase statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.23. This is consistent with my 
findings across the entire timeframe and confirms the repurchase agreement market’s 
volatility. While the dollar amount of repurchase agreements had a generally decreasing 
trend during QE1, weekly repurchase flows varied significantly. Large drops in primary 
dealer repurchase agreements were often followed by a few smaller increases before 
another significant decrease (see Figure 7). 
Change in short-term Treasuries held by the Fed was statistically significant in 
both regressions, with coefficients of -14.72 and -12.75 in the non-lagged and lagged 
regressions respectively. This suggests that as the Fed sold short-term Treasury securities 
the quantity of repurchase agreements increased. While the volume of short-term 
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Treasuries sold during QE1 was not particularly large, this suggests that the increase in 
short-term Treasuries available for trade in the market is associated with increased 
repurchase agreement transactions. This supports my hypothesis that that decreases in 
Federal Reserve holdings of securities that could be used for repos results in increases of 
repurchase agreements. 
Both regressions had statistically significant negative coefficients for change in 
long-term Treasuries held by the Fed. The Federal Reserve bought long-term U.S. 
Treasuries during QE1. Repurchase agreement flows decreased by 3.6 times the 
equivalent increase of long-term Treasuries held by the Federal Reserve. This supports 
my hypothesis that increased Federal Reserve purchases caused decreased repurchase 
agreement flows. 
The lagged regression found that an increase in mortgage-backed securities held 
by the Fed leads to a decrease in change in repurchase agreements two weeks later. I am 
not sure why the change in mortgage-backed securities has an effect on repurchase 
agreements two weeks later, versus Treasury effects occurring the week of. For some 
reason, the effect of mortgage-backed securities being taken off the market by the Federal 
Reserve is not felt until two weeks after the transaction. However, my initial regressions 
over the entire time period find the same two-week lag for mortgage-backed security 
changes to be associated with repurchase agreement changes. This could potentially be 
due to a delay in the delivery of mortgage-backed securities. The negative coefficients 
support my hypothesis that increases in mortgage-backed securities held by the Federal 
Reserve lead to decreases in primary dealer repurchase agreements. 
47 
 
Change in federal debt held by the public has negative and statistically significant 
coefficients in both regressions. This aligns with the findings during the entire dataset 
time period. This could be due to the fact that some of the securities held by the public 
are taken off the market after purchase. While financial businesses, which are included in 
this data series, are likely to continue trading Treasuries, the other entities may instead 
take these securities off the market, causing a total decrease in repurchase agreements. 
Change in federal debt held by the government is statistically significant in the 
lagged regression. This confirms my hypothesis that Treasury securities held by 
government agencies go into funds where they are not traded. The magnitude of this 
coefficient, -1.48, is greater than for federal debt held by the public, -0.99, which 
suggests that government holdings of federal debt have a more contractionary effect on 
repurchase agreements than do public holdings of federal debt. This makes intuitive sense 
because the entities included in the public, such as companies and individuals, are more 
likely to trade Treasury securities than is the Social Security fund, for example. 
Mortgage-backed security fails/mortgage-backed security transactions attempts to 
represent the tightness in the MBS market. This works because fails to deliver are 
thought to happen due to inability to secure the collateral necessary for the transaction. 
Both regressions find negative and statistically significant coefficients for MBS 
fails/MBS transactions. The coefficients for the non-lagged and lagged regressions equal 
-2,537.49 and -2,131.59, respectively. This suggests that as the mortgage-backed security 
market gets tighter, fewer repurchase agreements happen. Furthermore, in Figure 9 we 
see that mortgage-backed security fails increase as Federal Reserve holdings of 
mortgage-backed securities increase during QE1. Figure 10 shows the relationship across 
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the entire time period. I am able to use the dollar value for mortgage-backed security fails 
in this graph because mortgage-backed security fails and mortgage-backed security 
tightness have a 0.9867 correlation. Furthermore, MBS fails and Federal Reserve 
holdings of mortgage-backed securities have correlation coefficient of 0.75. This supports 
my hypothesis that increased Federal Reserve holdings of mortgage-backed securities is 
associated with greater MBS market tightness, which leads to fewer repurchase 
agreement flows. 
Figure 9: MBS Fails and Federal Reserve Holdings of MBS During QE1 (Millions of 
Dollars) 
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Figure 10: MBS Fails and Federal Reserve Holdings from 2005-2013 (Millions of 
Dollars) 
 
 These models explain 31.87% and 44.86% of the variation in primary dealer 
repurchase agreement changes during QE1 for the non-lagged and lagged regressions, 
respectively. These observations support my hypothesis that Federal Reserve purchases 
of securities that can be used in repurchase agreements lead to decreased amounts of 
primary dealer repurchase agreements. This shows that quantitative easing may have had 
the counter-productive tendency to decrease lending in the repurchase agreement market. 
By extension, it may have also decreased lending in the other parts of the shadow 
banking system, and not just in the repo market which is a subset of the overall shadow 
banking system. 
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C. Regressions During Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2) 
The Federal Reserve engaged in QE2 from November 3, 2010 to June 20, 2011. 
This round of quantitative easing focused on buying long-term U.S. Treasury securities. 
QE2 lasted for 35 weeks; therefore, the data include 35 weekly observations. This low 
sample size raises questions about the validity of the results, which is particularly 
important considering that 10 different variables are included in the regression. Given the 
small sample size, I believe my results for the entire time period and during quantitative 
easing one are more accurate. Still, the results from QE2 have some interesting features. 
These regression results are located in Table 4. 
During QE2, the weekly volume of repurchase agreements varied significantly 
(see Figure 11). The quantity of primary dealer repurchase agreements dropped 
significantly twice, but primary dealer repurchase agreements started and ended QE2 at 
similar values. During QE2, the Federal Reserve bought long-term Treasuries, sold some 
mortgage-backed securities, and bought small quantities of U.S. short-term Treasuries 
(see Figure 12). 
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Figure 11: Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreement Levels during QE2 (Millions of 
Dollars) 
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Figure 12: Federal Reserve Holdings during QE2 (Millions of Dollars) 
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collateral market during QE2. Therefore, the Federal Reserve attempting to reverse any 
collateral shortages is not a potential explanation for the positive coefficient.  
The positive change in short-term Treasuries coefficient could indicate that 
primary dealers had gotten over the scare caused in 2008, and were less concerned about 
counterparty risk and more willing to repo during QE2 than during QE1. Also, this could 
be a spurious relationship simply due to the low sample size. Third, this may occur 
because the flows of Fed holdings of short-term Treasuries remain relatively close to zero 
while repurchase agreement flows fluctuate both positively and negatively throughout the 
time period. The correlation coefficient between change in short-term Treasuries held by 
the Fed and primary dealer repurchase agreement flows equals 0.0977, suggesting 
minimal correlation between the two variables. Neither of the other variables for 
securities held by the Federal Reserve have statistical significance in this model, which 
shows that Federal Reserve holdings did not have a contractionary effect on repurchase 
agreements during QE2. 
 Change in federal debt held by the public has a negative coefficient of -1.05 and -
1.03 in the non-lagged regression and regression with lag of repo flows, respectively. 
This suggests about a one-to-one relationship between an increase in Treasuries held by 
the public and a decrease in repurchase agreement flows.  As discussed earlier, this could 
be due to the fact that many of the groups included in “the public” do not allow for their 
Treasury securities to be used for repurchase agreements, effectively taking them off the 
repo market. 
 Change in federal debt held by the government also has a negative coefficient; 
this coefficient equals -1.31 for the regression including a lag of change in primary dealer 
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repurchase agreements. This is consistent with my previous findings and confirms that 
increases in Treasuries held by government lead to decreases in repurchase agreements. 
 Treasury fails divided by Treasury transactions, which represents tightness in the 
Treasury market, is statistically significant with a negative coefficient.  The coefficient 
for the Regression 2 equals -38,054.62. This suggests that fewer repurchase agreements 
happen when the market for U.S. Treasury securities gets tighter. Fails to deliver can be 
caused by a lack of collateral availability. Mortgage-backed security market tightness was 
significant during QE1 when the Fed was buying mortgage-backed securities, and 
Treasury market tightness was significant during QE2 when the Fed was buying Treasury 
securities. This may indicate that repurchase agreements become more susceptible to 
changes in MBS or Treasury market tightness when the Federal Reserve is buying that 
specific type of security. 
 A dummy variable for Basel III is statistically significant with a negative 
coefficient in both regressions. This suggests that the passage of Basel III, which 
increased capital requirements for banks, led to a decrease in repurchase agreement flows. 
Given that many of the financial institutions Basel III is targeted at are the same primary 
dealers included in the repurchase agreement data, it is not surprising that Basel III has a 
large effect. As these banks are forced to keep more capital, thus, they cannot perform 
repurchase agreements with those securities. 
 My model explains 57.3% of the variation in the original regression and 62.15% 
of the variation in the model with a one-week lag of repo flows.  
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D. Regressions During Quantitative Easing 3 (QE3) 
QE3 started in September 13, 2012 and continued through the end of the dataset 
in March 2013. This round of quantitative easing involved the Federal Reserve 
purchasing both mortgage-backed securities and long-term U.S. Treasuries. The Fed 
bought $45 billion of long-term U.S. Treasuries and $40 billion of mortgage-backed 
securities each month. My dataset contains 28 observations during quantitative easing 
three. This small sample size is problematic and may indicate a lack of validity of my 
results. These regression results are located in Table 5. 
During the portion of QE3 that I have data for, the amount of primary dealer 
repurchase agreements fell, but did so with various fluctuations along the way (see Figure 
13). The Federal Reserve increased holdings of long-term U.S. Treasuries and mortgage-
backed securities during this time. 
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Figure 13: Primary Dealer Repurchase Agreements during QE3 (Millions of Dollars) 
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would help mitigate the effects of a collateral shortage. This may explain the lack of a 
relationship between Federal Reserve purchases and repurchase agreement flows during 
QE3. Also, the small sample size could contribute to the lack of significant relationships. 
Figure 14: Federal Reserve Reverse Repos (Millions of Dollars) 
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Conclusion 
 This paper analyzes the effect of Federal Reserve asset purchases, quantitative 
easing in particular, on the repurchase agreement market. Under certain circumstances, 
increases in Federal Reserve asset purchases lead to decreased flows of repurchase 
agreements. From 2005 to 2013, a two-week lag of increases in mortgage-backed 
securities held by the Fed is associated with a decrease in primary dealer repurchase 
agreements. This effect is most robust during QE1, during which the Federal Reserve 
increased its holdings of mortgage-backed securities and long-term U.S. Treasury 
securities. During QE1, I found that increases in Federal Reserve holdings of Treasury 
securities and mortgage-backed securities were associated with declines in primary dealer 
repurchase agreements.  
This demonstrates that Federal Reserve purchases have the ability to affect the 
shadow banking system, even though the shadow banking system falls outside of the 
Fed’s regulatory remit and beyond the traditional purview of Fed policy. The existence of 
the negative relationship between Federal Reserve purchases and primary dealer 
repurchase agreements under certain circumstances supports my hypothesis that 
quantitative easing led to decreased lending in the repurchase agreement market. The 
decrease in repurchase agreements is counterproductive to the goal of quantitative easing, 
which is to increase lending. 
The results do not find this relationship under all circumstances. During QE2 and 
QE3, increases in Federal Reserve security purchases are not associated with decreases in 
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repurchase agreement flows. Therefore, assertions of an overwhelming collateral 
shortage caused by quantitative easing are not supported. The lack of effect could be due 
to the small sample sizes or to the Federal Reserve taking actions to reverse the collateral 
crunch, which is evidenced by their increases in reverse repurchase agreements during 
QE3. Another possibility is that decreases in repurchase agreements during QE1 occurred 
in part due to market pessimism, and not entirely due to a lack of collateral availability. 
This study shows that the monetary policy has the potential to affect the shadow-
banking system, even if those effects are unintentional. While quantitative easing is 
aimed at traditional banking, unintended and counterproductive consequences may occur 
in the shadow bank system. The shadow banking system has become a huge part of our 
economy, warranting greater consideration by monetary policy makers. 
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